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Economic Imaginaries of the Global Middle Ages 
 
‘A global economic history can even less afford to ignore ‘culture’ in the sense of knowledge, 
rules of conduct and value-orientations than economic history in a national mode’.1 
 
This chapter explores two related prospects for the ‘global middle ages’: first, the loosening 
of conceptual ties in which modern historiography binds the middle ages;2 and, second, the 
reframing of the middle ages of conventional western historiography as a global 
phenomenon.3 It considers examples of the relationship between governance and wealth at 
intersections of culture-political and socio-economic history, and will explore ‘medieval 
globality’ as the unfolding of collective imaginaries in tension with diffuse local and 
entangled modes of evaluative agency. What constitutes value and who says so? It is scarcely 
                                                 
1 Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘Global History and Historical Sociology’ in James Belich, John 
Darwin, Margret Frenz, and Chris Wickham (eds.), The Prospect of Global History, eds., 
(Oxford, 2017), 26. The help and advice I have consulted for this chapter exceeds what is 
realistically possible to credit here, but I would like to thank Ilya Afanasyev, Milinda 
Banerjee, Tom Cutterham, Karin Barber, Tom McCaskie, Kate Skinner, Chris Wickham, and 
Bob Moore for their advice and support, the Political Economy reading group in the School 
of History and Cultures at Birmingham, and finally to all the members of the AHRC 
‘Defining the Global Middle Ages’ Network, especially its conveners, Catherine Holmes and 
Naomi Standen. All remaining errors are of course my own. 
2 See Carol Symes, ‘When We Talk about Modernity’, The American Historical Review, cxvi 
(2011), 715-26. 
3 For important ground work to this end, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, 2000). 
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credible that those periods currently circumscribed as ‘modern’ and ‘medieval’ can survive 
scrutiny from the perspective of global history. It is one thing, however, to spot the tyranny of 
a construct; another, by changing old habits, to erase it.4 A global approach should help to 
expose the illusory differences encoded in this binary, as we find more fruitful differences 
within and across their constituent elements.5 It should also reveal the immense variety of 
ways in which people across different periods and in different regions have thought about and 
experienced ‘economy’. If this is a term which is to be part of the global historian’s lexicon, 
it is important that we acknowledge that exceptional range of economic thought and 
experience. It is a range which renders the western-capitalist variant merely one of many 
modes of thinking and acting economically rather than the singular framework within which 
all societies, premodern and modern, are to be interpreted. 
 
The ways in which secular constitutionalism and liberal historicism have fixed upon the 
uniqueness of European capitalism – its definition, origins, and rise – as the backbone of 
grand narratives of transition, divergence, and modernization, have been elucidated in 
                                                 
4 Timothy Reuter, ‘Medieval: Another Tyrannous Construct’, in Reuter, Medieval Polities 
and Modern Mentalities, ed. Janet Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), 19-37.   
5 My use of ‘medieval’ and ‘middle ages’ in this chapter should be assumed to be in scare 
quotes, and be contrasted with ‘medieval globality’, which refers to that which might emerge 
from a fresh look at this period. I hold out little hope of the global middle ages being 
recovered on its own terms, but I do not see why much fruitful work by leading South 
Asianists recovering multiple modernities in an early modern, precolonial moment might not 




Chakrabarty’s study of the influence on western historiography of Adam Smith’s classical 
account of political economy and Marx’s subsequent critique. Their influence on 
historiography and the social sciences have made for a peculiarly narrow modern-Western 
view of the historical relationship between governance and wealth, the extent of whose 
colonizing effects on both the medieval and the non-European past have only relatively 
recently become apparent to scholars.6 Any exploration of medieval globality becomes partly 
dependent on a cultural critique of conventional frameworks derived from national and 
colonial teleological foundations. Such an approach may help us to avoid the reduction of the 
global middle ages to some infant precursor to modern globalization, understood as 
increasing market integration, price convergence, the free flow of commodities, labour, and 
capital, and growth recurring. 
 
Two early revisionist contributions, working broadly within but pointing beyond this 
tradition, have been offered by Janet Abu-Lughod and Christopher Bayly. Janet Abu-Lughod 
gathered abundant evidence of global medieval connectedness almost thirty years ago in her 
description of a complex world system of eight overlapping trade circuits spanning Eurasia 
and North and West Africa between c.1250 and c.1350 (Map 8). It was distinguished by 
cultural and political polycentrism, involving long distance trade between regional powers, 
aided by smaller societies, and with no evidence of the cultural exceptionalism associated 
with its modern successor, whether understood in terms of Weberian psychology, 
                                                 
6 Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization 
Govern the Politics of Time (Philadelphia, 2008); Bruce W. Holsinger, ‘Medieval Studies, 
Postcolonial Studies, and the Genealogies of Critique’, Speculum, lxxvii (2002) 1195-227; 
Geraldine Heng, The Invention of Race in The Middle Ages (Cambridge, 2018), and n. 2 
above. 
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institutional optimalities, ‘religious beliefs and values’, or any other designations of western 
civilization.7 Despite her immense contribution to the recovery of an Islamicate world system, 
which has encouraged some to explore a history of Islamic capitalism,8 her intention was not 
to supplant Immanuel Wallerstein’s account of the modern world system, but rather to check 
assumptions that his system had pristine western origins.9 
 
Christopher Bayly’s account of ‘archaic globalization’ for the period spanning these 
contrasting world systems, between 1300 and 1800, similarly emphasized the processual and 
cannibalistic nature of western globalization. Bayly described a period of increasing 
connectivity, and the eventual incorporation and subordination of local globalizing agencies 
to larger European colonial and capitalist operations across ever-widening circuits. In place 
of nations and political economy he adopted ideologies and consumption patterns as themes 
for understanding connectedness. According to Bayly, this phase of globalization was driven 
by prevalent epistemological commitments to cosmic kingship, universal religion and 
humoral understandings of the body. The principal role as economic actors played by 
imperial and state formations enabled middle-range institutions to operate within, 
parasitically upon, and beyond (at a distance from) state infrastructures through nomads and 
                                                 
7 Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony (Cambridge, 1989), 354. 
8 John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization (Cambridge, 2004); Jairus 
Banaji, ‘Islam, the Mediterranean and the Rise of Capitalism’, Historical Materialism, xv 
(2007) 47–74; Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu, How the West Came to Rule. The 
Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism (London, 2015).   
9 Rather, it was in part also to show how systems theories must take account of the fact that 
the ‘East fell before the West rose’; on Wallerstein, see Holmes and Standen in this volume, 
p. 00. 
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bandits, monastic orders, itinerant religious devotees, camel caravans, seaborne merchants, 
pilgrims and pirates.10  
 
Both these approaches usefully stressed the global implications of relations between socio-
economic arrangements and the culture-political in what might be called ‘a very early modern’ 
or ‘late premodern’ (as experimental alternatives to a ‘medieval’) context.11 Bayly’s account 
avoids the canalizing effect that network approaches can have on what are complex and 
textured cultural and social links, but he is more attentive in his model of archaic 
globalization to cultural consumption than to the production of meaning highlighted in the 
culturally pluralistic world system evoked by Abu-Lughod.12 The production of meaning and 
value that takes place at that imaginative junction between governance and wealth, of which 
classical western political economy is only one formulation among others, is one possible 
way of exploring medieval globality. 
 
1. Relativizing Political Economy  
We might usefully cast political economy not as a social science but as an example of 
mythopoesis. Situated literary readings of modern Europe’s social science antecedents have 
                                                 
10 A similar point is made for ‘at least until the middle of the nineteenth century’ by Michael 
Geyer and Charles Bright, ‘World History in a Global Age’ American Historical Review, c 
(1995), 1045. 
11 On these terms see also above note 5. 
12 Christopher Bayly, ‘’Archaic and ‘Modern’ Globalization in the Eurasian and African 
Arena, 1750-1850’, in A. G. Hopkins (ed.), Globalization in World History (London, 2002), 
47-73. 
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helped make visible their distorting and obscuring teleologies.13 For example, Kathryn 
Sutherland has described the ‘civic moralism’ of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations as a form 
of myth-making, the rhetorical equivalent of a free market in ‘different modes of saying, in 
which discourses of history, literature, anthropology, and ethical and scientific description 
compete and are exchanged’.14 Mike Hill and Warren Montag build on theological readings 
of Adam Smith, noting in his ‘invisible hand’ a benign providence at work in markets 
unbridled by the state, where his heroes, entrepreneurial artisans, traders, and gentleman-
investors, find personal moral and material enrichment through an immanent ‘oeconomy of 
nature’ that underwrites individual and national prosperity.15 
 
The conventional attribution of the ‘discovery’ of natural economic laws to Smith would 
have galled medieval Arab-Islamic scholars like Al-Ghazali, Ibn Taimiyya, and Ibn Khaldun, 
whose acute understandings of market forces matched his, even though they were articulated 
in different scriptural and moral frameworks.16 Nor should it escape our notice that 
ideological work on behalf of a ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative obscures the descent of 
Smith’s ‘oeconomy of nature’ from a Christian morality crystallized in the work of Thomas 
                                                 
13 See Andrew Cole and D. Vance Smith (eds.), The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages. On the 
Unwritten History of Theory (Durham, NC, 2010); Henning Trüper, Dipesh Chakrabarty and 
Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds.), Historical Teleologies in the Modern World (London, 2015). 
14 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, ed. Kathryn Sutherland (Oxford, 1993), xliv. 
15 Mike Hill and Warren Montag, The Other Adam Smith (Stanford, 2015). 
16 See, for example, Shaikh M. Ghazanfar (ed.), Medieval Islamic Economic Thought. Filling 
the ‘Great Gap’ in European Economics (London, 2003); Hamid Hosseini, ‘Seeking the 
Roots of Adam Smith’s Division of Labour in Medieval Persia’, History of Political 
Economy xxx (1998), 653-81. 
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Aquinas, that itself had depended on Arabic translations of Greek philosophy.17 Giorgio 
Agamben has similarly traced the providential core of the political economy of Smith and his 
interlocutors back to the thought of Aristotle and Xenophon, to whom the term oikonomia 
denoted ‘household governance’. Agamben shows how the idea percolated through medieval 
Christian scholarship into a theology of the divine government of the world enacted through 
the Trinity.18 
 
The role of the state is famously downplayed, though not wholly abandoned, in Smith’s 
account of governance and wealth, but is something Marx reasserts in his interpretation of 
primitive accumulation as a form of surplus extraction. But Marx’s use of feudalism and 
capitalism as developmental stages in history, and his etiolated theory of culture-politics,19 
limits our view of the global varieties of political economy that existed in the premodern 
world, notwithstanding talk of Asiatic or hydraulic modes of production.20 We might suspect 
that other types of economic imaginary were generative of different kinds of connectedness, 
and that these hollowed out, fed off, or dissolved those globalizing tendencies and 
characteristics that liberal historicists are conditioned to detect and narrate, whether those of 
                                                 
17 Shaikh M. Ghazanfar, ‘The Economic Thought of Abu-Hamid Al Ghazali and St Thomas 
Aquinas’, in Medieval Islamic and Economic Thought, 184-208. 
18 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory. For a Theological Genealogy of Economy 
and Government, trans. L. Chiesa (Stanford, 2011). 
19 Gareth Stedman Jones, Karl Marx. Greatness and Illusion (London, 2016), 395.  
20 Chris Wickham, ‘Memories of Under-Development: What Has Marxism Done for 
Medieval History, and What Can It Still Do?’ in Chris Wickham (ed.), Marxist History-
Writing For the Twenty-First Century (Oxford, 2007), 32-48; Reuter, ‘Another Tyrannous 
Construct?’ 
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conventional political economy or its materialist critiques.21 Religions, cultures or exegetical 
technologies – including here writing, gift exchange and embodiment – might help us to 
parse the various articulations of governance and wealth that lent impulse and energy to 
medieval globalities. 
 
2. Economic Imaginaries 
I borrow the germane phrase ‘economic imaginary’ from Tamara Chin’s recent examination 
of classical Confucian writings and material cultures of Han China (206 BCE-220 CE). I 
gloss the term here as a historically situated complex of literary and material discourses 
productive of meta-narrative themes of theodicy, providence, governance and identity, 
rendering them legible, reproducible and contestable in concrete terms. Chin’s book, Savage 
Exchange, is a highly nuanced study of an extended moment of rumination among Han 
China’s ruling elite (and especially during the reign of Emperor Wu in the first century BCE) 
over the relationship between governance and the increased economic and cultural exchange 
then occurring across the imperial frontier (Map 3).22 Emerging from this literature, and 
subsequently canonized in Chinese political culture, was the story of the ‘Tribute of Yu’, part 
of the Book of Documents, one of the Confucian classics.23 It detailed the ‘tributary model of 
imperial China’, the expression of what Chin calls ‘a hierarchical and centrally organized 
                                                 
21 Andrew Sartori, ‘Global intellectual History and Political Economy’, in Samuel Moyn and 
Andrew Sartori (eds.), Global Intellectual History (Columbia, 2013), 110-33. 
22 Tamara Chin, Savage Exchange. Han Imperialism, Chinese Literary Style, and the 
Economic Imagination (Cambridge, MA, 2014). 
23 See Michael Nylan, The Five “Confucian” Classics (New Haven, 2001), 123-36, for the 
origins, content and dating of the Documents. 
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agricultural world order’.24 Chin crucially shows how mixed analyses of market and tributary 
systems were an important part of these classical reflections, and remained grounds for 
subsequent debate about imperial policy, despite the tributary system’s primacy as a 
Confucian myth of political and moral authority. 
 
The qingzhong 輕重 theorists, among them Sima Qian, argued for state control of the frontier 
markets through monitoring and manipulation of the money supply. These took a quantitative 
and market-oriented view of cross-cultural relationships between those societies the tributary 
model identified as ‘barbarian’ and ‘civilized’. The victory of tribute over more ‘Smithian’ 
ideas had implications for normative social roles and domestic order including, for example, 
women’s labour in textiles. The market-oriented group upset the cultural politics of tribute 
through which male heads of households, by symbolically rendering grain and other 
agricultural produce to imperial agents, re-enacted domestic hierarchies. Chin here draws 
attention, not to the modern resonance of certain ideas found in this literature, but rather to 
the significance of its presence in the ‘economic imaginary’ of its own times. Her aim is not 
to trace the origins of the European political economy, but rather the ‘what-ifs’ of Han 
literary and material culture. In addition to a model of production and exchange, Chin’s 
approach powerfully contributes to the recovery of the meaning, form and affect of a non-
European classical understanding of wealth and governance emergent from the ‘Silk Roads 
of the mind’.25 
 
Literary culture and political cognition are the subjects of another ‘quasi-global’ order that 
Sheldon Pollock has, by naming it, brought into historiographical being: the ‘Sanskrit 
                                                 
24 Chin, Savage Exchange, 13. 
25 Tamara Chin, ‘The Invention of the Silk Road, 1877’, Critical Inquiry, xl (2013) 194–219. 
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cosmopolis’.26 For the first millennium CE, he has traced the supra-regional literarization of 
Sanskrit in the service of a political imagination; a language hitherto reserved for religion, 
which eventually spread geographically from Afghanistan to Java. After observing broad 
similarities between this and the formation of a Latin cosmopolis over the same period, 
Pollock insists on Sanskrit’s cosmological character as a process of accommodation between 
rajya (royal power) and kavya (literary culture),27 noting that jagat, the idea of ‘all that 
moves with life’, was far removed from universal ideas of territorial dominion engrained in 
Latin notions of Roman imperium. Both of these cosmopolitan ‘culture-political’ forms, he 
argues, ceded imaginative ground to imitative processes of literary vernacularization around 
the year 1000 CE. These were characterized by the expression of political idioms in emergent 
regional languages that focused on court elites strongly identified by place. New 
appropriations of formerly Sanskrit literatures were adapted for local political expression 
between the ninth and eleventh centuries in Kannada and Telugu, languages of the Deccan 
plateau, and in Sinhala, Chola, and Javanese.28 
 
The relationship between governance and wealth in this great political economic imaginary is 
famously treated in the Arthashastra, a compendium on statecraft and household governance 
assembled by the mid-second century CE, whose core is attributed to Kautilya, a rough 
                                                 
26 Sheldon Pollock, The Language of the Gods in the World of Men, Sanskrit, Culture and 
Power in Premodern India (Berkeley, 2006). 
27 Ibid., 2-10. 
28 Sheldon Pollock, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Vernacular in History’, in Carol Breckenridge, 
Sheldon Pollock, Homi K. Bhabha, and Dipesh Chakrabarty (eds.), Cosmopolitanism 
(Durham, NC, 2002), 30-2. 
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contemporary of Aristotle working at the court of Chandragupta Maurya.29 It conjures up a 
world of multiple competing kingdoms, and advises rulers on such things as diplomacy, 
espionage and trade, and the management of labour, land and financial resources in the 
pursuit of war, state security, and public welfare. Lost examples of its genre are known, and 
its broad ideas informed these and works in adjacent genres, including the Dharmashastra, of 
which the Manu Smriti (Laws of Manu) is the best known. We might be seeing a fleeting 
glimpse of the Arthashastra’s influence in the late sixth-century charter of Viṣṇuṣeṇa, a royal 
confirmation of the customs of a merchant guild, ‘in order to protect and settle the 
countryside, both the previously established [areas] and those which are not’.30 The Nitisara 
or Essence of Politics of Kamandaka, probably written between c.500 and c.700, certainly 
took up and modified the compendium’s content. Kamandaka’s ethically prescribed positions 
on warfare, judicial punishment, and hunting, mark notable departures from his work’s 
classical antecedent. Together they contributed to ‘a common stock of ideas and metaphors 
that became part of a relatively stable classical Indian model of kingship which, with regional 
and chronological variations, spread beyond the confines of the subcontinent into Southeast 
Asia as well’.31  
 
                                                 
29 Patrick Olivelle, King, Governance, and Law in Ancient India: Kautilya's Arthasastra 
(Oxford, 2013); Thomas R. Trautman, Arthashastra: The Science of Wealth (London, 2016). 
30 Timothy Lubin, ‘Writing and the Recognition of Customary Law in Premodern India and 
Java’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, cxxxv (2015), 232. 
31 Upinder Singh, ‘Politics, Violence and War in Kamandaka’s Nitisara’, The Indian 
Economic and Social History Review, xlvii (2010), 58. For its articulation across diverse 
regions through epigraphic evidence, see Singh, Kings, Brahmanas and Temples in Orissa, 
An Epigraphic Study AD 300-1147 (New Delhi, 1994). 
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Across the second half of the first millennium, at the other end of the Eurasian landmass, in 
Europe, and parts of North, East and West Africa, Greater Syria, and Iran, and centred on 
what Garth Fowden calls the ‘Eurasian hinge’, we witness the interlocutory formation of 
rabbinical, Christian and Islamic scriptural monotheisms (Map 6). These were characterized 
by the institutional transmission and reproduction of writing technologies and literacy, the 
reproduction, storage and interpretation of canonical texts through juridical, grammatical, 
exegetical, and prophetic techniques, and by the adaptation and literary innovation of, among 
other genres, history, law-codes, biography, and deeds of princes.32 
 
Medieval globality, in sum, was a world of intersecting cultural-political paradigms, 
determining but also entangled in the activities of inter-regional trade, migration, mission, 
transcultural communication and production. These typically piggy-backed on the imperial or 
royal extension of governance and deployment of wealth, and were supported by small-scale 
projects of accumulation, from piracy and plundering operations to distraint and confiscation. 
They were sanctioned by purpose-designed legal regimes enforcing debt repayment, and 
manorialized forms of intensive colonization and cultivation, and by production for the 
market, driven by local agents of principalities, kingdoms, and empires. These diverse, 
intersecting, spatio-temporal formations expanded, contracted and fragmented within 
changing ecological niches, territories and zones, and proved resilient or ephemeral in the 
face of political challenge and environmental conditions. They intruded almost invariably 
upon spaces already occupied by more or less self-governing communities rooted in wetlands, 
forests, hills, steppes, in landscapes demanding of specialist knowledge, skills and forms of 
                                                 
32 Garth Fowden, Before and After Muhammad The First Millennium Refocused (Princeton, 
2014). 
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communal organization marginal and resistant to state apparatus.33 At points of encounter 
like these we can begin to talk of processes of multilateral localism, world-making, and the 
dynamics of medieval globality.34  
 
3. Imaginary to Real: Entanglement and Emergence 
The economic imaginaries of medieval globality were not crystallized in particular religious 
or philosophical canons. Nor did they represent autarchic societies analogous to civilizations 
or nation states. This underlines the sterility of debates over the ‘origins of capitalism’, and 
points to further study of the mytho-poetical properties of these entangled and constantly 
emergent traditions, that set ontological parameters across a range of this- and otherworldly 
relations in what Marshall Sahlins has called a ‘real-politics of the marvelous’.35 As well as 
in the more obvious spheres of trade and conquest, ideas of governance and resource 
management spilled over political borders, conceptually and geographically. Examples 
include the cosmologically synchronizing pattern of pilgrimage established by Islam at 
Mecca, or by Christianity at Jerusalem; the dramatic expansion of twelfth- and thirteenth-
century Cistercian monasticism;36 or the earlier migration of Brahmanas from the Indus 
region to Orissa in the wake of Islamic incursions from the eighth to the twelfth centuries.37 
All were living traditions connecting different communities and societies, where they were 
                                                 
33 What James C. Scott calls ‘shatter zones’, for which see The Art of Not Being Governed 
(New Haven, 2010). 
34 For discussion of these and related ideas, see Nathalie Karagiannis, and Peter Wagner 
(eds.), Varieties of World-Making. Beyond Globalization (Liverpool, 2007), 1-12. 
35 Marshall Sahlins and David Graeber, On Kings (Chicago, 2017), 361. 
36 Emilia Jamroziak, The Cistercian Order in Medieval Europe (London, 2013).  
37 Singh, Kings, Brahmanas and Temples, 294-5. 
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recruited to serve different practices of endowment, evaluation, and exchange. The 
transmission of texts and exegetical technologies particularly created wider cognitive and 
material resources for thinking and acting with, that extended beyond human hierarchies. 
These traditions were cosmologically expansive, and implicated animals and gods, hidden 
forces and powers, and they enabled the negotiation, sometimes antagonistically, of local 
communal interests across social hierarchies, cultural borders and ecological areas. Locally 
mediated global phenomena in turn sent out tendrils or spores to sites where similar processes 
were simultaneously unfolding. This idea, of entanglement and emergence, might allow us to 
think of medieval globality as a distinctive and complex relationship between structure, 
process, and ontology, cross-cutting and breaking down the bounded spaces, whether 
physical or metaphorical, with which we usually deal. 
 
Parallel illustrations of how governance, exegetical practice and wealth intersected in 
Buddhism’s transcultural trajectories can be found, for example, in the Tang state’s 
circulation of silk, linen and hemp alongside coin as currency. Officials stamped and shipped 
these textiles out to the Dunhuang and Turfan frontiers to pay soldiers’ salaries, and for 
military equipment, and fodder for horses. Local traders sold textiles to families who used it 
to make, among other things, burial furnishings and shrouds. We know this from official 
expense accounts, and archaeological data from a seventh-century cemetery of Astana, 
Turfan, where tombs of twenty officials, their wives and concubines reveal stamped cloth. 
The wife of one official, Lady Dong, has the receipt for the recitation of sutras by Buddhist 
monks sewn into her shroud, its relatively poor quality signalling ‘conscious frugality’.38 
 
                                                 
38 Valerie Hansen and Helen Wang, ‘Introduction’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ser. 
3, xxiii (2013), 161. 
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The kingdom of Khotan and the thalassocracy of Srivijaya were both strategically situated on 
routes between China, Iran and western Eurasia, and the Indian Ocean. They were elements 
of a particular phenomenon of multi-local connectedness that Glen Dudbridge has called the 
‘book road’, a network of esoteric Buddhist connections spanning Central, South, East and 
Southeast Asia. These links may be identified as early as the second century, when Buddhist 
texts were first transmitted orally between monks from west to east,39 and then materially by 
monks like Xuanzang from the seventh to the ninth centuries, when the circulation of books, 
relics and the religious practices and ritual technologies they engendered, sustained political 
formations as far removed as Khotan, Sumatra, Samarkand and Silla.40 What we might call 
the maritime piracy of Srivijaya sufficiently dominated the Malay Archipelago from the 
seventh to the twelfth centuries to win recognition as an approved client and tributary state to 
imperial China.41 At its height, Srivijaya asserted political control over several port-cities, 
traded commodities from the Islamic world with China, and was extracting raw materials 
(camphor, incense, sandalwood, cloves) from upriver communities to supplement its 
collection of duties and carrying business.42 
 
The kingdom of Khotan, between China and Tibet on the southern edge of the Tarim Basin, 
                                                 
39 Tanya Storch, ‘Building a Buddhist Canon in Early Medieval China’ The Medieval History 
Journal, xviii (2015), 64-86. 
40 See chapter by Glen Dudbridge here. 
41 Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800-1830, 2 
vols. (Cambridge, 2009), ii, 772-80; Kenneth R. Hall, A History of Early Southeast Asia 
Maritime Trade and Societal Development, 100-1500 (Plymouth, 2011), 109-33. 
42 Søren M. Sindbæk and Athena Trakadus (eds.), The World in the Viking Age (Roskilde, 
2014), 115-18. 
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produced jade, silk and paper, and was a religious centre where different Buddhist traditions 
converged in the person of exiled and pilgrim monks seeking and circulating scrolls.43 It was 
probably a major conduit for Buddhism’s entry into Tibet in the late eighth and ninth 
centuries.44 We learn from Xuanzang, who stayed for several months in the capital Yotkan in 
644, that Buddhist monasteries flourished in the seventh century as brokers of knowledge and 
goods between pilgrims, traders and local populations.45 Oblate and part-time monks, and 
skilled craftworkers, were found in workshops, warehouses, and financial centres that 
provided loans, managed trade, and protected commodities in transit. Local aristocratic 
schemes that endowed these monasteries with people, land and resources received a blow 
from King Visya Sihya (736-46 CE), who expelled ‘bogus’ monks in a campaign against tax 
evasion.46 Strikingly, a similar call for the transfer of lands to episcopal control from those 
who, ‘having gained possession of farms and villages, free themselves from every bond, both 
human and divine’, appears in the letter of the king’s distant contemporary, Bede, to Bishop 
Egbert.47 
 
The intersection of political ambition, moral authority, and transregional commerce features 
                                                 
43 Susan Whitfield (ed.), The Silk Road, Travel, Trade, War and Faith (London, 2004), 134-
56. 
44 Richard Foltz, Religions of the Silk Road (London, 1999), 58. 
45 Sally Wriggins, The Silk Road Journey with Xuanzang (Cambridge, MA, 2004), 173-9.  
46 Cristoph Baumer, The History of Central Asia: The Age of the Silk Roads (London, 2014), 
141-2. 
47 Bede, Letter to Egbert, in Ecclesiastical History of the English People, ed. D. H. Farmer, 
trans., Leo Sherley-Price (London, 2003). 
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incidentally in a story preserved in Notger’s Deeds of Charlemagne.48 Written in the mid-
880s, Notger’s biography served an ambitious imperial rhetoric that in Christo-mimetic terms 
claimed world governance on behalf of Charlemagne and his latest Carolingian successor, 
Notger’s patron, Charles the Fat. Part of the text illustrated Charlemagne’s exemplary 
Christian kingship through his holding of an over-mighty bishop to moral account. Simon 
Maclean convincingly argues that Notger’s unnamed bishop was his and not Charlemagne’s 
contemporary, whom his intended audience would have swiftly recognized as Archbishop 
Liutbert of Mainz (Map 1). The archbishop had been removed from his office of arch-
chancellor when Charles the Fat succeeded his brother Louis the Younger and, if 
consequently isolated, clearly remained an important player in Carolingian dynastic politics. 
The Emperor Charlemagne, Notger tells us, heard of this ‘vainglorious and inane bishop’, 
and decided to set him a test. He instructed a Jewish merchant – who travelled across the seas, 
returning often from the Holy Land with wonderful, rare objects – to play a trick on him. The 
merchant, we are told, ‘caught an ordinary house mouse, stuffed it with various spices, 
wrapped it in silk, and then offered it for sale to the bishop, pretending he had brought it 
home from Judea’.49 Each time the bishop offered him more silver, the merchant refused it 
until the bishop could offer no more than the full measure of silver for this ‘most precious 
item’. Soon after the transaction, Charlemagne called a synod and exposed the bishop as a 
fool for wasting money on luxuries that Charlemagne had entrusted to him for the support of 
the poor. The episode belongs to a quartet of stories exposing the bishop to ridicule for his 
misjudged and inept attempts to recruit symbolic objects and wealth in the performance of 
princely ecclesiastical lordship. In one he tries to borrow the royal sceptre from the queen for 
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his own ceremonial purposes. In another, surrounded by his military retainers, he throws an 
absurdly lavish feast for two royal legates, and bribes them with ‘gifts worthy of royalty’ in 
the hope of softening their accounts of his incompetent sermonizing.50 
 
In this description of the marketing of ‘exotic’ goods at the court of a powerful ecclesiastical 
lord, and in the use of spice and silk, we glimpse prevailing perceptions and tastes for the 
exotic, even as the story tilts against their grain. Do these details imply that the merchant was 
attempting to counterfeit a relic? The ‘precious and rarely seen’ item’s Judean provenance 
and its aroma certainly made it fitting for discernment as an exotic, perhaps even sacred, item. 
His purchase of the object rehearsed the normative scene of the ecclesiastical lord as patron 
of the arts, as arbiter of good taste and connoisseur of the world beyond his diocese. But, in 
its satirical register, it broadcasted his political isolation, greed, and deficient personal 
ethos.51 The story is almost a textbook illustration of Pope Gregory the Great’s (590-604 CE), 
advice in his Pastoral Care on how to admonish those who misuse wealth entrusted to 
them.52 Unfortunately, as his soubriquet signals to posterity, Charles the Fat proved no better 
a trustee than the bishop in that administration of the divine government of the world that, 
according to Simon Maclean, Notger was trying to portray for Carolingian rulers. 
 
4. Islamic Globalities 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 113. 
51 Simon Maclean, Kingship and Politics in the Late Ninth Century, Charles the Fat and the 
end of the Carolingian Empire (Cambridge, 2003), 204-10.  
52 ‘…[for those who] are appointed for the service of others on whom they bestow what they 
have received, pride must not on any account inspire their minds with vanity…’, Gregory the 
Great, Pastoral Care, ed. and trans. Henry Davies (New York, 1950), 152-4. 
  371
The most singular and consequential event of medieval globality, which is only beginning to 
receive the wider public attention it deserves (and often for the wrong reasons), was the rise 
of the Islamicate world. The spread of Islam from the Arab peninsula to the Atlantic coast, to 
Western, Central, South and Southeast Asia, and to parts of Africa, created many and diverse 
regional experiments from Arabia, to Greater Syria, Iran, the Indo-Islamic world, and to 
North, West and East Africa, and Transoxania, in what Michael Cook has called the first 
global culture (Maps 1, 3, 7). Universal across these regions, if diverse in its syncretic 
regional manifestations, was a political economic imaginary expressed in Arabic. Islamic 
scriptural elites proved particularly imaginative in their experimentation with those pre-
Conquest cosmologies they encountered, among them Judaeo-Christian and Greek, and 
Zoroastrian and other vernacular Persian cultures. The latter reinvigorated Sunni Islam in an 
ebbing tenth- and eleventh-century Abbasid empire, and from the eleventh to the thirteenth 
centuries fed a religious culture different again to that of either the Abbasids or Iberian 
Umayyads in its interactions with Sanskrit vernaculars in South Asia and beyond.53 Cook 
presents the silver coin or dirham as supremely emblematic of global Islam. These were 
produced with some consistency over thousands of miles and featured a resounding 
declaration of God’s authority inscribed on them in the language of the Qur’an.54 But 
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Qur’anic inscription also appeared on other cultural media, whether in the decorative patterns 
of the tiraz system,55 or in monumental contexts. At the West African Songhay-Mande 
meeting point of Bentyia in modern Niger, Arabic inscriptions of the later thirteenth to 
fifteenth centuries reveal communities of Muslims served by the khatib and the wazir, who 
among other things brokered relationships with indigenous cultures, organizing everyday 
forms of coexistence and exchange around practices that drew upon the empowering 
connections that Islamic networks made possible.56 
 
The preeminence of the Qur’an as moral justification for Islamic worldly authority and the 
responsibilities attached to the stewardship and dispensation of its revenues – including 
taxation,57 plunder, agricultural produce, charity, and commercial tolls – were the subject of 
the Book of Revenue (Kitab al-Amwal), a detailed legal collection of Qur’anic precedent and 
juridical tradition assembled in the ninth century by Abu Ubayd al-Qasim ibn Sallam.58 The 
work is not concerned with mapping social relations in terms of an agrarian world order, but 
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rather with the moral accountability and financial responsibilities of the faithful. It enlists all 
the faithful in a pastoral role, giving them responsibility for justice in matters of political and 
material wealth.59 The theme of protection, trust and moral obligation attached to Muslim 
religious practice was extended from the ruler as shepherd of the ruled, to the domestic 
sphere, where women were seen as shepherds of their children and families alongside (and 
therefore explicitly protected from the plunder and rapine of), conquering Muslim armies. 
 
5. Conquest and Coexistence 
An important dynamic of medieval globality was conquest and colonization. Aspirant rulers, 
upon conquering territories, needed to contract socially with local institutions. The tombs and 
shrines of holy men and women were useful for auditioning elites, preserving communal 
solidarities, and for safeguarding mechanisms of internal order. Cults offered holy quarantine, 
and immunity. They were places of negotiation, where earthly authority might be suspended, 
and counter-imaginary power voiced through supernatural power displayed in vibrant, sacred 
matter. 
 
An example of this is the story of William Duke of Normandy’s invasion of the Isle of Ely in 
1071, which had been the scene of a ‘last stand’ of English lords.60 Through the littered 
bodies of the English dead and body parts (feet, hands, eyes) of the punished captives, 
William, ‘approached the monastery, gave instructions to a large force to guard the doors and 
entrances of the church, his aim being that when he went there to pray, there should be no 
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means of access for the monks to seek him out or come to meet him in the appropriate 
supplicatory guise with crosses and the relics of the saints’.61 William’s first encounter with 
St Aethelthryth, the patron saint of Ely, would be direct, on his terms, and, according to the 
account, hesitant: ‘standing a long way from the holy body of the virgin, he threw a gold 
mark on to the altar, not daring to approach closer, he was afraid of having judgment passed 
on him by God for the evils which his men perpetrated in the place’. What are we to make of 
this scene? 
 
The account tells us William was in a state of fear when approaching the shrine, anxious that 
his moral condition exposed him to the judgment of God. Perhaps (the inference seems 
intended) the monks could have secured proper introductions had he allowed them to 
approach him with crosses and relics. On the other hand, was that how it really happened? 
We might reasonably imagine a conqueror awash with testosterone, confidently controlling 
the space he has just taken, by locking the monks out of their own church and placing himself 
between them and their beloved Aethelthryth, and by lobbing a gold coin in the general 
direction of the shrine. The scene recalls Geertz on the interpretation of actions and their 
meanings, ‘a speck of behavior, a fleck of culture, and voilà, a gesture’.62 William’s toss of 
the coin is presented to us as a twitch, an involuntary reaction to the shrine motivated by fear 
and awe. But could it have been a wink, or a perfunctory nod to the saint’s local fame? 
William the Bastard, the respecter of indigenous rights? Whatever St Aethelthryth meant to 
the English and to him, William had put the monastic custodians of her cult on probation. 
The monks of Ely eventually bought their way back into his favour through the mediation of 
Gilbert de Clare, the member of a Norman family close to William that was interested in East 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 229. 
62 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), 6. 
  375
Anglian real estate. A payment of what turned out to be 1000 silver marks was raised through 
the surrender to royal agents and moneyers, presumably where appropriate for melting down, 
of ‘crosses, altars, reliquaries, [gospel-books], chalices, patens, lavers, stoups, bowls and gold 
and silver dishes.’63 This was a pretty neat arrangement: the expedient destruction and de-
consecration of precious ornaments and utensils that were presumably redolent of the old 
regime, and the beginning of a beautiful friendship with St Aethelthryth’s powerful new 
neighbours. 
 
We might compare this with other forms of encounter between aspirant rulers seeking to 
consolidate their control of newly conquered territories, and indigenous sacred champions, 
whether saints’ relics, shrines dedicated to deities, or ‘idols’. Such encounters involved new 
entanglements between communities, conversions across value regimes communicated 
through the negotiation of new material and spatial arrangements, the striking of new forms 
of accommodation and coexistence through gift exchange, the de- and re-consecration of 
sacred objects, or their destruction and repurposing. 
 
Take the Muslim Turkic insurgencies from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries from Iran 
and Afghanistan into the Indus valley (Map 6). Modern scholars of South Asia have debated 
the reliability of historical accounts like that of Al-Biruni (c.1030)64 of the scale and violence 
of these temple raids.65 André Wink calls these sacred plundering raids ‘a religious 
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phenomenon of the frontier’.66 More recently Azfar Moin has pointed out that the textbook 
practice of Hindu rulers such as King Indra III of the tenth century, which could be consulted 
in advice manuals, was to destroy the temples of rival kings.67 Moin interestingly goes on to 
argue that Turkic violence against shrines was motivated by a growing astrological 
conviction that sovereignty was deserting the Caliphate and could be found relocated in the 
tombs of Sufi saints. Plundering expeditions thus cleared complex social spaces for new 
forms of local patronage, secured huge amounts of bullion presumably to pay off armies and 
keep campaigns afloat, and worked in a transcultural context of juxtaposed value regimes 
involving Indic kingship and Turkic-Sufi sovereignty. While in previous centuries, ‘idols’ 
might be plundered, and sent to Baghdad as gifts to the Caliph with, as Finbarr Flood 
comments, the effect of ‘making distance tangible’,68 their de-thesaurization kept money and 
patronage flowing in local, cross-cultural exchange. These expeditions were indeed 
accompanied by an inward-migration of Sufis from the Iranian plateau who, according to 
subsequent hagiographies, engaged in close-quartered spiritual tournaments with Hindu yogis, 
from one location to the next across the sacred Hindu landscape. 
 
Shahid Amin characterizes this as a kind of composite of two religious cultures, entangled 
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not fused, dissolved or ‘resolved’, and worked out open-endedly through continuous ongoing 
reconfigurations of sectarian loyalties and compromises based on working arrangements that 
surface in later literature.69 The tomb of one such enduringly famous warrior saint, Syed 
Salar Masud, a relative of Mahmud Ghazni who was martyred in 1034, aged nineteen 
(according to his improbably well informed sixteenth-century biographer), is located at 
Bahraich (in North East Uttar Pradesh, Map 3). Ibn Battuta recalls being brought there by the 
Delhi Sultan Tughluq in 1341, among other things presumably to document the esteem with 
which he was held by the people of this provincial backwater of his empire.70 
 
Conclusion 
These brief sketches of the cultural plurality that Abu-Lughod identified as characteristic of 
the medieval world system hardly do justice to the diverse ways in which each mediated 
between on the one hand cosmological drama, or to the complexities and contingencies of 
local processes of socio-economic and political reproduction, and on the other hand the 
formation of ethnic and religious identities in conditions of coexistence and, at times, 
conquest. But a broader consideration of political economy at this scale of the economic 
imaginary disrupts the deceptively tidier assumptions about the global middle ages that reside 
in the language of civilization, world religion, nation, economy, and individual. Such a 
reframing also allows us to uncouple and historicize familiar political and religious 
formations upon whose long term historical determinism we have customarily attached undue 
emphasis. It permits discussion of internal contradiction and subjunctive possibilities, and 
differentiation within emic categories, which allow us to explore how people were permitted 
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or encouraged to think with and enact literary and cultural forms, how consent was 
articulated, how values were transmitted through given expressions that implicated bodies, 
texts and objects.71 
 
This chapter has offered a few preliminary thoughts on the properties of medieval – ‘late 
premodern’, ‘very early modern’ or even, we might say, ‘Time B’ – globality, to offer clues 
for the study of such a globality’s historical dynamics. Liberal historicism has often 
misrepresented or ignored non-western experiences of the global premodern – including its 
various temporalities and cosmologies, the political valences of peasant and subaltern 
magical consciousness, astrology and occultism – because such phenomena have exceeded 
historicism’s analytical and explanatory parameters.72 Further study of medieval globalities 
can help to show how the building blocks of modern political economic frameworks have 
older, globally-entangled genealogies. In these frames, the close supervision of money 
production and the regulation of markets and exchange were implicated in a wider human 
economy in which polities interacted with diffuse institutions and communities, where 
concrete forms of sovereignty and immunity, divine assistance, theodicy and providence, 
were realized through mixed evaluative practices. There is a productive tension in current 
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anthropological debates between structural and relational interpretations of these kinds of 
entanglements. We might explore this tension through studies of structures and ontologies in 
the global middle ages73 – so far as they provide what Lauren Benton calls a way of treating 
‘cultural process and the global economy as inextricably linked’ – and by exploring what 
Sheldon Pollock calls that ‘dialectic between global and local in which both are brought into 
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